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I. INTRODUCTION 
By its enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) 
in 1977,1 the United States became the first country to prohibit the 
bribery of foreign public officials.2 For many years thereafter, the 
United States remained the only country to have implemented and 
enforced such a prohibition. A series of significant international 
developments in the 1990s and the early part of this century have 
dramatically changed the landscape.3 
 
 1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1–78dd-3, 78ff (2013)). 
 2. E.g., Alan L. Monk, The Cost of Doing Business? Laws Against Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, FRASER MILNER 
CASGRAIN LLP (revised Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/the-cost-of-doing-business-laws-against-35536/. 
 3. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, 
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999); 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions Ratification Status as of 20 November 2012, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) 
[hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery Status]; Org. of Am. States, Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996) (entered into 
force on Mar. 6, 1997); OAS, Signatories and Ratifications: B-58: Inter-American 
Convention Against Corruption, Signatories and Ratifications (1996), available at 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html [hereinafter Inter-American 
Convention Signatories]; Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on 
Corruption, January 1, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505 (entered into force July 1, 2002); 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption Status as of 7/6/2009, Council of Europe, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=173&CM=8&DF
=7/6/2009&CL=ENG (last visited Sept. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Status of Parties to 
CoE Criminal Law Convention]; African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, 43 I.L.M. 1 (2004) (entered into force Aug. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/ 
Convention%20on%20Combating%20Corruption.pdf; List of Countries Which 
Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the African Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, AFRICAN UNION, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ 
Corruption.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) [hereinafter African Union Convention 
List of Signatories]; United Nations Convention against Corruption, G.A. Res. 
58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003) (entered into force December 14, 2005); 
Chapter XVIII Penal Matters, 14, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-14.en.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 
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Today most developed countries have implemented, and 
increasingly enforce, domestic legislation prohibiting the bribery of 
foreign public officials.4 Virtually all other countries are parties to 
international conventions prohibiting the bribery of foreign public 
officials.5 It is only a matter of time before most of the world will 
have adopted domestic legislation prohibiting the bribery of foreign 
public officials. The enforcement of the FCPA by the United States 
and the adoption by the United Kingdom of its Bribery Act 2010 
(“UK Bribery Act”)6 have both received considerable attention. But 
the recent adoption of critical amendments by Canada to its 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”)7 signals the 
need for increased attention to be given to Canadian law with respect 
to foreign bribery. 
II. CANADA’S CORRUPTION OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIAL’S ACT 
On December 7, 1998, Canada adopted the CFPOA8 in 
conjunction with its ratification of the Organisation for Economic 
 
2013) [hereinafter Status of Parties to U.N. Convention Against Corruption]. 
Additionally, the World Bank and the regional development banks, including the 
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank, 
began to seriously address the issue of corruption and its relationship to 
development in their procurement practices. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 347 (2010) 
(explaining that because multilateral lending institutions have so much leverage 
over borrower governments, the institutions have implemented procurement 
policies that “seek to eliminate opportunities for corruption associated with their 
operations and to tie lending to progress in combating corruption”). 
 4. Convention on Combating Bribery Status, supra note 3 (listing forty 
countries, including Canada, which, as of November 20, 2012, deposited 
instruments of ratification or accession to the OECD Convention). 
 5. See Inter-American Convention Signatories, supra note 3 (listing thirty-
three countries, including Canada, that have deposited instruments of ratification or 
accession); Status of Parties to U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 3 
(listing ratification status of 167 parties, including Canada); Status of Parties to 
CoE Criminal Law Convention, supra note 3 (listing forty-one countries that had 
ratified or acceded to it, including Canada); African Union Convention List of 
Signatories, supra note 3 (listing thirty-one countries that ratified the AU 
Convention). 
 6. Bribery Act 2010 (“UK Bribery Act”), c. 23 (U.K.). 
 7. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34 (Can.). 
 8. Id. 
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Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”).9 The CFPOA was 
Canada’s OECD Convention implementing legislation, and the law 
became effective on February 14, 1999.10 
In adopting the CFPOA, Canada created an act separate from its 
Criminal Code. The CFPOA combines the OECD Convention’s 
language and requirements with language already in Canada’s 
Criminal Code.11 By its terms, the CFPOA is designed to 
accommodate additional international conventions relating to the 
corruption of foreign public officials.12 This now includes Canada’s 
 
 9. Convention on Combating Bribery Status, supra note 3. After being an 
original signatory to the OECD Convention on December 17, 1997, Canada 
deposited its instrument of ratification on December 17, 1998. Canada Review of 
Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recommendation, ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV. 1, http://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/2385703.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Canada 
Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation]; Convention on Combating 
Bribery Status, supra note 3. 
 10. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, § 13. 
 11. Compare id. § 3(1) (“Every person commits an offence who, in order to 
obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business, directly or indirectly gives, 
offers or agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to 
a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of a foreign public 
official . . . as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection 
with the performance of the official’s duties or functions.”), with Canada Criminal 
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 121(1) (Can.) (outlining the definition of frauds 
committed on the government by any individual who “directly or indirectly gives, 
offers or agrees to give or offer to an official or to any member of his family, or to 
any one for the benefit of an official . . . a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any 
kind as consideration for cooperation, assistant, exercise of influence or an act or 
omission.”) and Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, supra note 3, art. 1 (mandating that each Party 
make it a criminal offense “under its law for any person to offer, promise or give 
any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of 
official duties, in order to retain business or other improper advantage in the 
conduct of international business”). 
 12. The long title of the CFPOA is “An Act Respecting the Corruption of 
Foreign Public Officials and the Implementation of the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, and to 
Make Related Amendments to Other Acts.” Corruption of Foreign Public Officials 
Act (Can.) § 3; Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, 
supra note 9, pt. A (stating that “by using the term ‘Corruption’ in the Act’s title, 
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ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 
(“Inter-American Convention”), which became effective on January 
6, 2000,13 and its ratification of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (“UN Convention”), which became effective on 
October 2, 2007.14 
More recently, Canada amended the CFPOA to broaden its 
jurisdictional reach and the breadth of its prohibitions.15 These 
amendments were, in large part, prompted by criticism of the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions (“OECD 
Working Group”).16 The amendments coincide with considerable 
efforts by Canadian authorities to establish and train special units of 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police devoted to enforcement of the 
CFPOA.17 Canadian authorities have also sought to ensure the 
 
there is room for the Act to grow to accommodate new legislative provisions 
falling under this heading should Canada, in the future, undertake to sign and ratify 
additional international conventions dealing with such matters”). 
 13. Inter-American Convention Signatories, supra note 3, at 5 (demonstrating 
that no reservations or declarations were asserted by Canada with respect to Article 
VIII, relating to transnational bribery, which is the provision that corresponds to 
the CFPOA). 
 14. Status of Parties to U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 3 
(including no reservations or declarations were asserted by Canada with respect to 
Article 16, the provision of the UN Convention that corresponds with the CFPOA). 
 15. Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, Bill S-14, § 
5, 41st Parliament (1st Sess. 2013) (enacted) (Can.), available at http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/2013_26.pdf. 
 16. See ROBIN MACKAY, BILL S-14: AN ACT TO AMEND THE CORRUPTION OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS ACT, LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY, § 1.3 (May 28, 2013) 
(Can.), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/LegislativeSummaries/41 
/1/s14-e.pdf (explaining that the OECD Working Group objected to the CFPOA’s 
limited jurisdictional reach, the dearth of Canadian investigators “working to 
uncover bribery among foreign public officials,” and the weakness of penalties for 
violating the Act); see also Phase 3 Report on Implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention in Canada, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. WORKING 
GRP. ON BRIBERY ¶¶ 15–24, 121, 133–35 (Mar. 2011), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44572654_1_1_1_1,00
.html [hereinafter Canada Phase 3 Report] (outlining concerns that (1) the foreign 
bribery offense under the CFPOA applies solely to bribes for the purpose of 
obtaining or retaining an advantage in the course of “business for profit,” (2) 
Canada should amend the CFPOA to introduce nationality jurisdiction over the 
foreign bribery offense, and (3) Canada should amend the CFPOA to “expressly 
prohibit the making of off-the-books accounts and transactions, the recording of 
non-existent transactions, and the use of false documentation”). 
 17. See Canada: Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report & Recommendations, ORG. 
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY 8 (May 2013), 
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availability of prosecutors with the requisite level of expertise.18 
Numerous cases are currently under investigation and a further 
increase in enforcement is generally anticipated.19 
A. THE ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION 
The CFPOA provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Every person commits an offence who, in order to obtain or retain an 
advantage in the course of business, directly or indirectly gives, offers or 
agrees to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind to 
a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of a foreign public 
official 
(a)as consideration for an act or omission by the official in connection 
with the performance of the official’s duties or functions; or 
(b)to induce the official to use his or her position to influence any acts or 
decisions of the foreign state or public international organisation for 
which the official performs duties or functions.20 
B. JURISDICTION 
With the recent amendments to the CFPOA,21 conduct that may 
 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/CanadaP3writtenfollowupreportEN.pdf 
[hereinafter Canada Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report] (noting that, as of the date 
of the follow-up report, fifteen full-time CFPOA enforcement positions within the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police were funded and that “the actual number of 
investigators working on CFPOA investigations between Ottawa and Calgary is 
significantly greater than fifteen, having drawn additional resources to assist with 
large investigations”). 
 18. See id. at 9 (highlighting the creation of a “senior cadre of prosecutors, with 
expertise of the highest level” that will act as a national resource for complex and 
high-profile CFPOA prosecutions). 
 19. See, e.g., id. (recommending that more Canadian prosecutorial resources be 
dedicated to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada for the “soon expected . . . 
case-load of potentially more than 20 cases”); MACKAY, supra note 16, § 1.3 
(calling attention to Transparency International’s 2012 progress report that 
highlighted the thirty-four Canadian CFPOA investigations that were then 
underway). 
 20. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 3(1) (Can.). 
This article will use English spellings customary in the United States, except for 
quoted language using Canadian spellings. 
 21. Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, Bill S-14, § 
5, 41st Parliament (1st Sess. 2013) (enacted) (Can.), available at http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/2013_26.pdf. 
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otherwise violate the CFPOA is now subject to both territorial and 
nationality jurisdiction. 
1.  Territorial Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official is 
established in Canada when the offense is committed in whole or in 
part within its territory. Canada’s territorial jurisdiction can extend to 
conduct taking place on aircraft registered with Canadian 
authorities,22 on aircraft that terminate in Canada,23 and on any 
aircraft where the person committing the offense on the aircraft is 
later present in Canada.24 
An extensive physical connection between the offense and Canada 
is not required. The leading case in Canada on territorial jurisdiction 
is the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Libman,25 which established 
that an offense is “subject to the jurisdiction of [Canadian] courts 
[when] a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence 
took place in Canada . . . . [I]t is sufficient that there be a ‘real and 
substantial link’ between an offence and [Canada].”26 What 
constitutes a “significant portion” or a “real and substantial link” to 
establish territorial jurisdiction is a factual inquiry that courts make 
on a case-by-case basis.27 Of significance with respect to the 
 
 22. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 7(1)(a) (Can.). 
 23. Id. § 7(1)(b). 
 24. Id. § 7(2). 
 25. R. v. Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 214 (Can.) (upholding a trial court’s 
finding that where a defendant sold fraudulent shares of mining companies to U.S. 
residents from an office in Canada but received the money in either Costa Rica or 
Panama, the fraud could properly be prosecuted in Canada). 
 26. Id. at 213. 
 27. In R. v. Niko Resources Ltd., a publicly traded company headquartered in 
Calgary, Canada, pled guilty to a violation of the CFPOA with respect to its 
indirect foreign subsidiary, Niko Bangladesh. R. v. Niko Resources Ltd., [2011] 
101 W.C.B. (2d) 118 (Can. Alta. Q.B.), Agreed Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 1, 55. In 
2005 Niko Bangladesh purchased and provided the use of a vehicle, valued at 
$190,984, to a Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources. Id. ¶ 
4. Later, Niko Resources paid travel and accommodation expenses for the minister 
to travel from Bangladesh to Calgary to attend an oil and gas exposition. Id. ¶¶ 5, 
35–37. Niko Resources also improperly paid approximately $5,000 for the 
minister’s non-business travel to New York. Id. ¶¶ 5, 37. Even though Niko 
Bangladesh was a Barbados corporation wholly owned by Niko Cayman, which, in 
turn, was a wholly owned foreign subsidiary of Niko Resources, the latter 
ultimately agreed that it had a real and substantial link to what took place in 
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CFPOA, the Supreme Court in Libman noted that Canada “should 
not be indifferent to the protection of the public in other countries.”28 
The relationship between territorial jurisdiction and Canadian law 
on conspiracy also bears on the CFPOA’s jurisdictional reach. 
Territorial jurisdiction is established in Canada when a person 
conspires in Canada to commit an act in another country that is an 
offense under the laws of that country and that would also be an 
offense if committed in Canada.29 Alternatively, jurisdiction is 
established if a person conspires in another country to commit an 
offense in Canada.30 “If an offence under the [CFPOA] was or would 
have been committed by conspirators outside of Canada, then the 
conspiracy to commit that offence is deemed to have taken place 
within Canada.”31 “It is not necessary that the offence intended by 
the conspirators be completed.”32 
2. Nationality Jurisdiction 
The CFPOA is now subject to nationality jurisdiction.33 Regardless 
of whether the individual or entity may be subject to Canada’s 
 
Bangladesh. Id. ¶ 10. Niko Bangladesh, including the acquisition of the vehicle, 
was fully funded by Niko Resources. Id. ¶¶ 11, 39. The CEO of Niko Resources 
was on Niko Bangladesh’s board of directors. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Niko Resources 
closely monitored the activities of Niko Bangladesh, including the flow of money 
from Niko Resources to Niko Bangladesh, even small transactions and accounting 
practices. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 19. Niko Resources was also aware of a letter on Niko 
Bangladesh stationery confirming delivery of the vehicle for the minister’s use. Id. 
¶¶ 33, 34. 
 28. Libman, 2 S.C.R. at 214. In Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. 
Canadian Liberty Net [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 (Can.), a private organization changed 
its message to refer callers to a phone number in the United States to hear racist 
messages. Citing Libman, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the facts of the 
case “[did] not even test the outer limits of [the] principle” as the advertisement for 
the racist messages was made in Canada on the same phone line where the original 
messages had been available. Id. at 671. In R. v. Hammerbeck, 1993 CanLII 613, ¶ 
26 (Can. B.C.A.C.), the accused took his daughter to the United States and kept her 
there for three weeks in violation of a child custody order. The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal held that Canadian courts had jurisdiction over the father’s 
prosecution because the abduction started in Canada. 
 29. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 465(3) (Can.). 
 30. Id. § 465(4). 
 31. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 4.1. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 5 (Can.). 
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territorial jurisdiction, the CFPOA applies to Canadian citizens,34 
“permanent resident[s],”35 and any “public body” or entity formed 
“under the laws of Canada or a province.”36 “[P]ermanent resident” 
is “a person who has acquired permanent resident status and has not 
subsequently lost that status.”37 
C. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
1. Any Person 
The CFPOA offense is intended to apply to “every person.”38 
a. Juridical Entities 
In addition to a natural person, a “person” includes an 
organization,39 which can include “a public body, body corporate, 
society, company, firm, partnership, trade union or municipality,” or 
an association of persons created for a common purpose with an 
operational structure that holds itself out to the public as an 
association of persons.40 
 
 34. Id. § 5(a). 
 35. Id. § 5(b). 
 36. Id. § 5(c). 
 37. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 2(1); see 
also id. § 27(1) (noting that a permanent resident in Canada is a person who is not 
a Canadian citizen but who has been granted permission to live and work in 
Canada without any time limit on his or her stay); id. § 28(1) (“A permanent 
resident must comply with a residency obligation with respect to every five-year 
period.”); id. § 28(2)(a) (including “with respect to a five-year period if, on each of 
a total of at least 730 days in that five-year period, they are (i) physically present in 
Canada, (ii) outside Canada accompanying a Canadian citizen who is their spouse 
or common-law partner or, in the case of a child, their parent, (iii) outside Canada 
employed on a full-time basis by a Canadian business or in the federal public 
administration or the public service of a province, (iv) outside Canada 
accompanying a permanent resident who is their spouse or common-law partner or, 
in the case of a child, their parent and who is employed on a full-time basis by a 
Canadian business or in the federal public administration or the public service of a 
province, or (v) referred to in regulations providing for other means of 
compliance”). 
 38. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(1). 
 39. Id. § 2; Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 2 (Can.). 
 40. Can. Crim. Code § 2 (“organisation”). The first prosecution and plea under 
the CFPOA was against a corporate entity, Hydro Kleen Systems Inc. R. v. Watts, 
[2005] A.J. No. 568; 2005 AB.C. LEXIS 613, ¶ 140 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (stating that 
the sentencing principles to be considered should be those “under section 426, the 
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b. Standard of Liability for Juridical Entities 
Canada no longer relies on the “identification theory” under the 
common law, having codified a standard for organizational liability. 
An organization is a party to an offense if, with the intent at least in 
part to benefit the organization, one of its senior officers 
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence; 
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting 
within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other 
representatives of the organisation so that they do the act or make the 
omission specified in the offence; or 
(c) knowing that a representative of the organisation is or is about to be a 
party to the offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them 
from being a party to the offence.41 
A “senior officer” is “a representative who plays an important role 
in the establishment of an organisation’s policies or is responsible for 
managing an important aspect of the organisation’s activities and, in 
the case of a body corporate, includes a director, its chief executive 
officer and its chief financial officer.”42 
2. Intentionally 
Though the CFPOA does not refer to intent,43 under Canada’s 
Criminal Code, criminal offenses are presumed to require proof of 
mens rea “unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.”44 The 
intention and knowledge elements of mens rea also include willful 
blindness,45 but they do not include a “should have known” 
standard.46 The involvement of an intermediary does not alter the 
 
secret commissions under the Criminal Code”). 
 41. Can. Crim. Code § 22.2. 
 42. Id. § 2. 
 43. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(1); Canada Review of 
Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 9, pt. 1.1.2. 
 44. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.2 (citing R. v. Cogger (1997), 214 N.R. 64 3d 322 (Can); R. v. Cooper, 
[1978] 1 S.C.R. 860 (Can)). 
 45. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.2. 
 46. Id. (stating that the “should have known” standard amounts to negligence 
or lack of due diligence). 
  
380 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:2 
nature of the mens rea requirement.47 
It is not an offense simply to give something of value to a foreign 
public official with no expectation of anything in return. The phrase 
“in order to” in the definition of the offense implies a purpose 
underlying the act of giving of a benefit.48 In essence, the phrase “in 
order to” imparts a quid pro quo element to the offense.49 The 
“benefit” is given or offered to the official in order to induce the 
official to use his or her official position to the business advantage of 
the person making the bribe. 
3. Offer, Promise, or Give 
The CFPOA uses the terms “gives, offers or agrees to give or 
offer.”50 This is identical to the language used in the Criminal Code 
for improper inducements to public officials in Canada.51 
a. Indirectly or Through Intermediaries 
Although the CFPOA does not make specific reference to the 
application of the offense to bribes given through intermediaries,52 
the words “directly or indirectly” cover bribes given through 
intermediaries.53 Depending upon their degree of knowledge, 
 
 47. Id. pt. 1.1.5; see discussion, infra Part II.C.3. 
 48. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.2. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 3(1) (Can.). 
 51. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, §§ 121(1), 123(1) (Can.). 
 52. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(1). 
 53. Id. As part of the plea agreement entered into by Griffiths Energy 
International Inc. (“GEI”), the Agreed Statement of Facts refers to a situation 
whereby a foreign official may have benefitted in a number of indirect ways. R. v. 
Griffiths Energy Int’l Inc., Agreed Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 2, 39, 55, 412, Jan. 14, 
2013 (Can. Alta. Q.B.), available at http://www.cba.org/CBA/advocacy/PDF/ 
Griffiths_Amended_Statement_of_Facts.pdf [hereinafter R. v. GEI, Agreed 
Statement of Facts]. In particular, a consulting firm owned by the wife of Chad’s 
Ambassador to the United States and Canada was the recipient of a major payment 
from GEI. Id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 38. The consulting agreement was essentially identical to 
the consulting agreement that had been previously proposed with an entity owned 
by the Ambassador. Id. ¶¶ 20, 34. In addition, the Deputy Chief of the Chadian 
Embassy in Washington, D.C. directed where the funds to the consulting firm 
owned by the Ambassador’s wife were to be deposited. Id. ¶ 38. There was also an 
arrangement whereby the Ambassador’s wife purchased founders shares in GEI. 
Id. ¶ 23. The wife of the Deputy Chief of the Chadian Embassy was also allowed 
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intermediaries can also be prosecuted as being complicit parties to 
the offense.54 
b. Attempt 
Liability exists for attempting to commit an offense regardless of 
whether it was, in fact, possible to commit the offense so long as the 
accused intends to commit the offense and “does or omits to do 
anything for the purpose of carrying out the intention.”55 The penalty 
is imprisonment for a term that is one-half of the longest term to 
which a person who is guilty of the offense is liable.56 No “general 
criterion” has been established to articulate a clear line between 
preparation and attempt.57 A determination must be made on a “case-
by-case basis, having regard to the relationship between the nature 
and quality of the act in question and the nature of the complete 
offence, as well as the relative proximity of the act in question to 
what would have been the completed offence.”58 “[W]here an 
accused’s intention is otherwise proven, acts, which are on their face 
equivocal in nature, may nevertheless be sufficiently proximate so as 
to constitute an attempt.”59 
 
to purchase founders shares as was an individual by the name of Adoum Hassan. 
Id. ¶ 24. The Ambassador’s wife subsequently took steps to have Mr. Hassan’s 
shares transferred to her consulting firm and then her personal account by using a 
power of attorney granted by Mr. Hassan to the Ambassador giving the latter 
authority over Mr. Hassan’s shares. Id. 
 54. See discussion, supra Part II.C.3.c. 
 55. Can. Crim. Code § 24(1). The provisions of the Criminal Code “relating to 
indictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all 
the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to summary conviction offences apply 
to all other offences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the 
enactment otherwise provides.” Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, § 34(2) 
(Can.). 
 56. Can. Crim. Code § 463 (applying to situations where the violation of the 
underlying indictable offense is for a term of imprisonment of fourteen years or 
less). 
 57. R. v. Deutsch, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 2, 3-4 (Can.) (describing the difference 
between preparation and attempt as “essentially a qualitative one”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.3(2); see R. v. Sorrell, 1978 CarswellOnt 1205, ¶ 23 (Can. Ont. Ca.) (WL) 
(noting that where the defendants donned balaclavas, carried a loaded gun, and 
knocked on a store window, but abandoned their robbery plans after being told the 
store was closed, the defendants had still attempted robbery since “acts which on 
their face are equivocal, may, nonetheless, be sufficiently proximate to constitute 
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c. Complicity 
Given the application of Canada’s Criminal Code with respect to 
complicity to all indictable offenses,60 a violation of the CFPOA may 
fall within the ambit of its provisions. A person who aids and abets 
the offense of bribing a foreign public official would be guilty of an 
indictable offense and liable for the same punishment as for the 
normal offense.61 Canada’s Criminal Code states that where two or 
more persons “form an intention in common to carry out an unlawful 
purpose and to assist each other,” and one of them carries out the 
common purpose, committing an offense, each would be culpable for 
that offense.62 
In addition, where a person counsels another person to be a party 
to the offense and that other person is afterwards a party to that 
offense, the person who counseled is a party to that offense and 
subject to the same penalty as the offense that was committed,63 
regardless of whether “the offence was committed in a way different 
from that which was counselled.”64 Moreover, the person who 
counseled is “a party to every offence that the other commits in 
consequence of the counseling.”65 The term “counsel” also includes 
the acts of procuring, soliciting or inciting another to commit an 
offense.66 
d. Conspiracy 
Any person who conspires with another to commit an indictable 
offense is guilty of that offense and is liable to the same punishment 
“as that to which an accused who is guilty of the offense would, on 
conviction, be liable.”67 This includes conspiring in Canada to do 
 
an attempt”). 
 60. Interpretation Act (Can.) § 34(2) (applying all provisions of the Criminal 
Code relating to indictable offenses to any enactment that creates an indictable 
offense); Can. Crim. Code § 21 (designating parties to an offense as those who 
actually commit the offense, do or omit to do anything for the purpose of aiding 
another to commit the offense, or abet another in committing the offense). 
 61. Can. Crim. Code § 21. 
 62. Id. § 21(2). 
 63. Id. § 464(a). 
 64. Id. § 22(1). 
 65. Id. § 22(2). 
 66. Id. § 22(3). 
 67. Id. § 465(1)(c). 
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anything abroad that would be an offense under the laws of the 
foreign jurisdiction.68 It is also an offense to conspire outside Canada 
to do anything prohibited in Canada.69 As a result of the CFPOA’s 
status as an indictable offense, conspiring to violate the CFPOA 
would also be an indictable offense. 
4. Any Undue Pecuniary or Other Advantage 
The CFPOA prohibits the giving or offering of a “loan, reward, 
advantage or benefit of any kind” to a foreign public official.70 
“Benefits of any kind” covers diverse forms of benefits,71 including 
intangible benefits.72 The ability to confer a benefit upon a third party 
“would be some benefit to the foreign public official.”73 
5. Foreign Official 
A “foreign public official” under Canadian law includes a number 
of categories of foreign public officials.74 One category includes “a 
person who holds a legislative, administrative or judicial position of 
 
 68. Id. § 465(3)(1). 
 69. Id. § 465(4). 
 70. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 3(1) (Can.). 
The word “undue” was not used “because it is the giving of the loan, etc., in the 
context of the offence . . . that renders the loan, etc., ‘undue.’” Canada Review of 
Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 9, pt. 1.1.4. 
 71. R. v. Hinchey, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1128, 1130 (Can.). 
 72. See Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra 
note 9, pt. 1.1.7 (citing R. v. Hinchey, 3 S.C.R. at 1128). 
 73. Id. “[T]he wording ‘to a foreign public official or to any person for the 
benefit of the foreign public official’ is derived from [section] 121(1)(a)(i) of the 
Criminal Code.” Id. (citing Canadian authorities). “It is designed to cover the 
situation where a foreign public official might not receive the bribe himself or 
herself, but instead direct that the benefit be given to another person.” Id. One 
example might be “favourable publicity and indirect pecuniary benefits such as 
reduced tuition expenses arising from scholarships paid directly to a school or an 
adult child.” Id.; see, e.g., R. v. Griffiths Energy Int’l, [2013] A.J. No. 412 ¶¶ 20, 
39 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (holding that GEI violated § 3(1)(b) when it provided a cash 
incentive to a company wholly owned by the Chadian ambassador’s wife to help 
GEI secure an oil and gas rights from the Chadian government and then paid the 
company $2,000,000 when GEI secured the rights). 
 74. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 2 (defining foreign 
state as “a country other than Canada” including: “(a) any political subdivision of 
that country; (b) the government, and any department or branch, of that country or 
of a political subdivision of that country; and (c) any agency of that country or of a 
political subdivision of that country”). 
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a foreign state,”75 which includes “a political subdivision” of the 
state.76 The definition of “foreign public official” does not expressly 
apply “whether elected or appointed,” but by implication, the 
terminology incorporates both elected and appointed officials.77 
a. Parastatals78 
A foreign public official also includes a person exercising a public 
function for a “public agency” of a “foreign state,” which includes 
“an agency of that country or of a political subdivision of that 
country.”79 A number of enterprises fall within this definition, 
including boards, commissions, corporations, or other bodies or 
authorities “established to perform a duty or function on behalf of the 
foreign state, or performing such a duty or function.”80 
b. Public International Organizations 
The CFPOA definition of public foreign official in relation to 
public international organizations closely follows the definition in 
the OECD Convention.81 It applies to “an official or agent of a public 
international organisation that is formed by two or more states or 
governments, or by two or more such public international 
organisations.”82 
 
 75. Id. (defining “foreign public official,” under subsection (a), as including “a 
person who performs public duties or functions for a foreign state” and “an official 
or agent of a public international organisation that is formed by two or more such 
public international organisations”). 
 76. Id. (referring to the definition of “foreign state” in subsection (b)). 
 77. See Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra 
note 9, pt. 1.1.6 (explaining that in Canada’s view, using the phrase “whether 
elected or appointed” was not necessary since the CFPOA definition section 
already extends the law to any person holding a legislative, administrative, or 
judicial position in a foreign state). 
 78. A “parastatal” is a government-owned or government-controlled entity. 
Parastatal, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ 
dictionary/business-english/parastatal?q=parastatal (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 79. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 2 (referring to the 
definition of “foreign public official” in subsection (c)). 
 80. Id. (referring to the definition of “foreign public official” in subsection (b)). 
 81. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.6. 
 82. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 2 (defining “foreign 
public official” in subsection (c)). 
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c. Political Party, Political Party Official, or Candidate for Office 
The Canadian definition of a foreign public official under the 
CFPOA does not include a political party, political party official, or 
candidate for public office. 
6. In Order that the Official Act or Refrain from Acting in Relation 
to the Performance of Official Duties 
This offense criminalizes “the giving of an advantage” or other 
acts as consideration “for an act or omission by the official in 
connection with the performance of the official’s duties or 
functions.”83 The CFPOA does not state that the offense applies to 
acts or omissions irrespective of whether they are within the 
official’s authorized competence; however, Section 3(1)(b) is 
designed to apply to the situation in which the bribe is given, “not for 
the purpose of having the foreign public official act or omit to act in 
areas over which the official is authorised to act, but to influence 
others within the foreign state or public international organisation.”84 
7. To Obtain or Retain Business or Other Improper Advantage 
The CFPOA applies to “a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of 
any kind” to a foreign public official to “obtain or retain an 
advantage in the course of business.”85 The provision is not limited to 
the obtaining or retaining of “business or other improper 
advantage.”86 The language would extend to “efforts to secure 
improper advantages in the course of business as well as other 
advantages which would otherwise be proper but for the bribery.”87 
 
 83. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.8 (citing Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(1)(a)). 
 84. Id. There is also no requirement that the foreign public official be actually 
influenced for there to be a violation of the CFCPA. See, e.g., R. v. GEI, Agreed 
Statement of Facts, supra note 53, ¶¶ 31, 50 (emphasizing that even though the 
Ambassador ultimately may not have influenced Chad’s granting of oil and gas 
rights to GEI, GEI still violated the CFPOA). 
 85. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(1). 
 86. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.9. (explaining that the language in subsection 3(1) is intentionally broad 
so as to encompass the Convention’s “business or other improper advantage” 
notion). 
 87. Id. (“For example, it would be an offence within the meaning of subsection 
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The CFPOA prohibits improper advantages “because securing an 
improper advantage” does not fall within the purview of a foreign 
public official’s duties or functions.88 
Under the CFPOA, “business” refers to “any business, profession, 
trade, calling, manufacture or undertaking of any kind carried on in 
Canada or elsewhere.”89 With the removal of “for profit” from the 
definition in the recent amendments to the CFPOA,90 non-profit 
entities are clearly intended to fall within the ambit of the 
prohibitions of the CFPOA.91 
D. EXCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
What might be termed exceptions and affirmative defenses under 
the CFPOA are largely based on the FCPA.92 
1. Statute of Limitations 
Since it is an indictable offense, no limitation period exists in 
Canada concerning the investigation and prosecution of the bribery 
of foreign officials under the CFPOA.93 
 
3(1) to bribe in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage 
whether or not the company concerned was the best qualified bidder or was 
otherwise a company which could properly have been awarded the business.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 2 (“business”). 
 90. See Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, Bill S-
14, ch. 26, § 2(3), 41st Parliament (1st Sess. 2013) (enacted) (Can.), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/2013_26.pdf. 
 91. MACKAY, supra note 16, § 2.1; Canada Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report, 
supra note 17, at 6. Previously, Canada explained to the OECD Working Group 
that non-profit entities would not be exempted from the purview of the offense on 
the basis that they were captured by the definition of “person” under the Criminal 
Code. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.10 (citing Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 15(2) (Can.) 
(“person”)). Nevertheless, the OECD Working Group has consistently raised 
concerns as to the need for legislation clarifying this provision. Canada Phase 3 
Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 15–24. 
 92. See Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra 
note 9, pt. A. (noting that the exceptions and defenses stem from policy 
considerations in other foreign anti-corruption legislation). 
 93. Id. pt. 6. 
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2. Local Law 
An exception is provided for a “loan, reward, advantage or 
benefit” that is “permitted or required under the laws of the relevant 
foreign state or public international organisation.”94 The exception is 
“intended to encompass all laws, regardless if they are written, as 
well as regulations.”95 Where an official of a public international 
organization is involved, “the laws of the public international 
organization itself,” not those of the “country within which the 
organisation is situated, are relevant to the exception.”96 
3. Reasonable and Bona Fide Business Expenses 
Reasonable business expenses are excluded from the offense of 
bribery of foreign officials. The loan, reward, advantage or benefit 
must be a reasonable expense 
incurred in good faith, made by or on behalf of the foreign public official 
and be directly related to . . . the promotion, demonstration or explanation 
of the person’s products or services, or . . . the execution or performance 
of a contract between the person and the foreign state for which the 
individual performs duties or functions.97 
Alternatively, the loan, reward, or benefit must be either permitted 
or required according to the laws of the foreign state or the public 
international organization for which the foreign public official 
performs duties or functions.98 
 
 94. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(3)(a). 
 95. Canada Review of Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 
9, pt. 1.1.4 (citing Canadian authorities). 
 96. Id. (citing Canadian authorities). 
 97. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(3)(b). With respect to 
reasonable and bona fide business expenses, the CFPOA “reflects a policy concern 
that is also reflected in a similar provision in the [FCPA].” Canada Review of 
Implementation and 1997 Recommendation, supra note 9, pt. 1.1.4 (citing 
Canadian authorities). In interpreting this exception, “Canadian courts could well 
examine U.S. texts, commentaries and case law on the U.S. defence, although 
Canadian courts may choose not to follow the U.S. approach.” Id. However, unlike 
the FCPA, where reasonable and bona fide business expenses are an affirmative 
defense, and not an exception, the burden under the CFPOA is on the prosecution, 
and not the defendant, to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the defence does 
not apply.” Canada Phase 3 Report, supra note 16, ¶ 25. 
 98. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(3)(a). 
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4. Facilitation Payments 
Upon the entry of an order of the Governor in Council,99 the 
CFPOA will no longer provide an exception for facilitation 
payments.100 Prior to the recent amendments to the CFPOA, 
facilitation payments were permitted.101 However, at least in the near 
term, they will continue to be permitted. Ultimately, under the terms 
of the recent amendments to the CFPOA, they will be prohibited.102 
5. Duress 
A person who commits an offense may be excused from 
committing that offense if he or she acted “under compulsion by 
threats of immediate death or bodily harm from a person who is 
present when the offence is committed.”103 The person who commits 
the offense must believe that the threats against his or her life will be 
carried out, and he or she must not be subject to compulsion as a 
party to a conspiracy or association.104 
 
 99. Act to Amend the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, Bill S-14, § 
26(5), 41st Parliament (1st Sess. 2013) (enacted) (Can.), available at http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/2013_26.pdf. 
 100. Id. § 3(2). 
 101. Facilitation payments are considered payments made “to expedite or secure 
the performance by a foreign public official of any act of a routine nature that is 
part of the foreign public official’s duties or functions.” Corruption of Foreign 
Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(4). “An ‘act of a routine nature’ does not include a 
decision to award new business or to continue business with a particular party, 
including a decision on the terms of that business, or encouraging another person 
to make any such decision.” Id. § 3(5). These facilitation payments include: “(a) 
the issuance of a permit, licence, or other document to qualify a person to do 
business; (b) the processing of official documents, such as visas and work permits; 
(c) the provision of services normally offered to the public, such as mail pick-up 
and delivery, telecommunication services, and power and water supply; and (d) the 
provision of services normally provided as required, such as police protection, 
loading and unloading of cargo, the protection of perishable products or 
commodities from deterioration, or the scheduling of inspections related to 
contract performance or transit of goods.” Id. § 3(4). 
 102. MACKAY, supra note 16, § 2.3 (“[T]he elimination of facilitation payments 
will not come into force on Royal Assent like the rest of the bill but, rather, on a 
day to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council.”). In Canada, the Governor in 
Council is the Governor General acting on the advice of the federal cabinet. See 
Role and Responsibilities, THE GOVERNOR GENERAL OF CANADA, 
http://www.gg.ca/document.aspx?id=3 (last modified Feb. 19, 2013). 
 103. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 17 (Can.). 
 104. Id. 
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In addition, any common law rule and principle specifying that 
certain circumstances in the commission of an offense constitute “a 
justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge” may also 
apply.105 In this regard, the defense of necessity is also available, 
though it applies only in circumstances of imminent risk where an 
act was taken on an involuntary basis “to avoid a direct and 
immediate peril.” The act was involuntary if it was inevitable and 
unavoidable and if the party that undertook the act did not have a 
reasonable opportunity to take an alternative course of action that 
would not have involved a violation of the law.106 The harm resulting 
from the “violation of the law must be less than the harm the accused 
sought to avoid.”107 
E. THE CFPOA RECORD-KEEPING OFFENSE 
The CFPOA was recently amended to include an offense for 
inaccurate record-keeping or destroying records for the purpose of 
bribing a foreign public official or for the purpose of hiding that 
bribery.108 In conjunction with such conduct, the prohibition applies 
 
 105. Id. § 8(3). 
 106. Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 232, 233 (Can.). 
 107. Id. (“Where it was contemplated or ought to have been contemplated by the 
accused that his actions would likely give rise to an emergency requiring the 
breach of the law, it may not be open to him to claim his response was involuntary; 
mere negligence or involvement in criminal or immoral activity when the 
emergency arose, however, will not disentitle an accused from relying upon the 
defence.”). 
 108. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 4(1) (Can.). 
In addition to the new record-keeping offense, various forms of falsification of 
books and records can be subject to criminal prosecution in Canada where there is 
also an intent to deceive or induce others to rely on the inaccurate books and 
records. These offenses can include crimes involving false pretenses, forgery, 
trafficking or possessing a forged document, fraud affecting the market relating to 
securities, falsification of books and documents, and a false prospectus. Can. Crim. 
Code §§ 361–62, 366–67, 368, 380, 397. However, in the absence of evidence of 
intent to deceive or defraud, there may be limitations on the applications of these 
provisions. See Canada Phase 3 Report, supra note 16, ¶ 133. In addition, 
provincial securities commissions can “bring cases for books and records 
violations, either in the form of injunctive actions or cease-and-desist 
proceedings.” Id. ¶ 136. Similarly, financial disclosure violations may also be 
implicated. Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c-I21, § 155 (requiring the 
annual disclosure by companies to shareholders of financial statements, reports of 
auditor, and other financial information required by their governing documents, 
such as by-laws). See generally MACKAY, supra note 16, § 2.4 (noting that in the 
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to anyone who 
(a) establishes or maintains accounts which do not appear in any of the 
books and records that they are required to keep in accordance with the 
applicable accounting and auditing standards; 
(b) makes transactions that are not recorded in those books and records or 
that are inadequately identified in them; 
(c) records non-existent expenditures in those books and records; 
(d) enters liabilities with incorrect identification of their object in those 
books and records; 
(e) knowingly uses false documents; or 
(f) intentionally destroys accounting books and records earlier than 
permitted by law.109 
III.CANADA’S SECRET COMMISSIONS OFFENSE 
Though not part of the CFPOA, Canada’s secret commissions 
offense may supplement the CFPOA in certain situations to the 
degree that conduct commonly referred to as private or commercial 
bribery is involved and is subject to Canadian jurisdiction.110 Unlike 
the CFPOA, whether the intended recipient is a foreign public 
official is not relevant to a violation. At its core, the secret 
commissions offense is premised on “the importance of the agency 
relationship and the necessity of preserving the integrity of that 
relationship.”111 For this reason, it may be used in conjunction with 
the CFPOA particularly in situations where it is unclear whether an 
entity is a parastatal.112 
 
case of false books and records violations, Canada’s Business Corporations Act 
may be implicated). 
 109. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) §§ 4(a)–(f). 
 110. Can. Crim. Code § 426. 
 111. R. v. Kelly, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 170, 185 (Can.). “The legislative history of 
[the secret commissions offence] demonstrates that the purpose and intent of it is 
to criminalize an agent’s or employee’s act of accepting ‘secret commissions’ for 
showing favour or disfavor to any person with relation to the affairs or business of 
his principal.” Id. at 186 (quoting R. v. Morris (1988), 64 Sask. R. 98, 116 (Sask. 
C.A. Can.)). 
 112. For example, in the sentencing associated with the first prosecution brought 
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A. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE 
The secret commissions offense provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: Every one commits an offence who 
(a) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer 
to an agent or to anyone for the benefit of the agent — or, being an agent, 
directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, accepts or offers or agrees to 
accept from any person, for themselves or another person — any reward, 
advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for doing or not doing, 
or for having done or not done, any act relating to the affairs or business 
of the agent’s principal, or for showing or not showing favour or 
disfavour to any person with relation to the affairs or business of the 
agent’s principal.113 
B. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 
The same principles of territorial jurisdiction apply to the secret 
commissions offense as they do to a violation of the CFPOA.114 
However, principles of nationality jurisdiction do not apply to a 
violation of the secret commissions offense.115 
 
under the CFPOA, R. v. Watts, [2005] A.J. No. 568 (Can. Alta. Q.B.), the Crown 
made specific reference to the similarities between the CFPOA and the secret 
commissions offense. Id. ¶ 140 (“[T]he sentencing principles to be considered 
[under the CFPOA] are akin to those under the [secret commissions offence].”). 
 113. Can. Crim. Code § 426(1)(b) (including an alternative provision, not 
related to the CFPOA, but concerning every person who “with intent to deceive a 
principal, gives to an agent of that principal, or, being an agent, uses with intent to 
deceive his principal, a receipt, an account or other writing (i) in which the 
principal has an interest, (ii) that contains any statement that is false or erroneous 
or defective in any material particular, and (iii) that is intended to mislead the 
principal”). 
 114. See discussion, supra Part II.B.1. 
 115. See Neil Campbell, et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices: The Growth and 
Limitations of Canadian Enforcement Activity, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 
43–46 (2013) (discussing the CFPOA’s jurisdictional limitations when compared 
with the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the United Kingdom’s 
Bribery Act 2010, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted 
“territorial jurisdiction” to “encompass activity that has a real and substantial 
connection to Canadian territory,” and clarifying that Canada does exercise 
nationality jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances). 
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C. ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE 
1. Any Person 
Like the CFPOA, the secret commissions offense is also intended 
to apply to “every person.”116 The secret commissions offense applies 
to both individuals and entities in the same manner as a violation of 
the CFPOA.117 
2. Intentionally 
For a violation of the secret commissions offense, while there 
must be proof that the person to whom the benefit was offered was 
an agent, the agent need not have a specific principal when the offer 
was made or intend to carry out the purpose for which the offer was 
made.118 The “gravamen” of the offense or the part of the offense that 
weighs more heavily against the accused is “the offer to the agent 
and the corrupt intention accompanying the offer.”119 An offer is 
corrupt even though the agent may not intend to carry out the act.120 
Under the secret commissions offense, there must be proof of 
“corrupt intent” on the part of the person seeking to improperly 
induce an agent.121 In the particular context of the offense, the term 
“‘corruptly’ . . . designates secrecy as the corrupting element of the 
offence.”122 The failure to disclose the inducement of an agent makes 
 
 116. See Can. Crim. Code § 426(1), (4) (explaining that, under the secret 
commissions offense, “‘agent’ includes an employee, and ‘principal’ includes an 
employer”). 
 117. Compare id. § 2 (defining the term “every one,” giving the same meaning 
to the terms “every one,” “person,” and “owner,” and explaining that those terms 
include “an organization”), with id. § 426 (employing the term “every one” when 
specifying who may commit the offense) and Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 2 (Can.) (stating that “person” means a person as 
defined in § 2 of the Canada Criminal Code). 
 118. R. v. Wile, [1990] 74 O.R. (2d) 289, 297 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
 119. Id.; see R. v. Reid, [1969] 1 O.R. 158, 168 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Laskin, J.A., 
concurring) (asserting that the deciding factor in whether an act of giving was 
corrupt was “the purpose of the accused to influence such a result or reward such a 
result”). 
 120. Wile 74 O.R. (2d) at 297; see Reid, 1 O.R. at 168 (“[T]here may be a 
corrupt giving within . . . even though it turns out that the receiving agent did 
nothing untoward but merely acted in the ordinary course.”). 
 121. R. v. Kelly, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 170 (Can.). 
 122. Id. at 188. 
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the agent’s receipt of the commission or reward corrupt because, as a 
result, the principal is unable to determine whether to act upon the 
advice of the agent or accept the actions of the agent.123  
3. Offer, Promise, or Give 
The secret commissions offense includes similar language to the 
CFPOA: “gives, offers or agrees to give or offer.”124 Like the 
language used in the CFPOA, it captures a broad range of conduct 
that may constitute an inducement.125 This includes the authorization 
of such conduct.126 
a. Indirectly or Through Intermediaries 
Like the CFPOA, the secret commissions offense includes 
identical language, “directly or indirectly,” in referring to the manner 
in which a violation may occur.127 The use of intermediaries would 
thereby be incorporated within the scope of the prohibitions of the 
secret commissions offense. Indeed, the secret commissions offense 
is specifically applicable to anyone “who is knowingly privy to the 
commission of” the secret commissions offense.128 
b. Attempt, Complicity, and Conspiracy 
The principles that apply to attempt, complicit conduct, and 
 
 123. Id. at 188–89. 
 124. Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 426 (Can.). 
 125. Compare id. § 426(1)(a) (“Every one commits an offence who directly or 
indirectly, corruptly gives, offers or agrees to give or offer to an agent or to anyone 
for the benefit of the agent—or, being an agent, directly or indirectly, corruptly 
demands, accepts or offers or agrees to accept from any person, for themselves or 
another person—any reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for 
doing or not doing, or for having done or done, any act relating to the affairs or 
business of the agent’s principal, or for showing or not showing favour or 
disfavour to any person with relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s 
principal.”), with Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 
3(1) (Can.) (providing that the offense of bribing a foreign public official may 
include that of “offer[ing] or agree[ing] to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage 
or benefit of any kind to a foreign public official or to any person for the benefit of 
a foreign public official”). 
 126. See Can. Crim. Code § 426(1)(a) (using the language “directly or indirectly 
gives” to describe conduct that constitutes an inducement). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. § 426(2). 
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conspiracy with respect to a violation of the CFPOA also apply to 
violations of the secret commissions offense.129 
4. Agency Relationship 
The secret commissions offense seeks to address improper 
inducements “for doing or not doing, or for having done or not done, 
any act relating to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal, or 
for showing or not showing favour or disfavour to any person with 
relation to the affairs or business of the agent’s principal.”130 In 
essence, the inducement seeks to cause an agent to breach his or her 
fiduciary relationship with the principal. 
The secret commissions offense is designed to protect the integrity 
of the fiduciary relationship between a principal and agent.131 
Whether the intended recipient of the improper inducement is a 
foreign public official is not relevant to a violation. The critical 
factor is whether the intended recipient of the improper inducement 
is an agent.132 In this regard, “[t]he simple, unrestricted language 
used in the [secret commissions statute] was intended . . . to capture a 
broad array of relationships predicated on a relationship of trust 
between agent and principal, including the basic employee/employer 
relationship.”133 
As a result, in some situations, the secret commissions may be 
used as an alternative offense to a violation of the CFPOA when it is 
unclear whether the intended recipient is an employee or agent of a 
 
 129. See Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, § 34(2) (Can.) (specifying that 
“[a]ll provisions of the Criminal Code relating to indictable offences apply to 
indictable offences created by an enactment . . . except to the extent that the 
enactment otherwise provides”). 
 130. Can. Crim. Code § 426(1)(a). 
 131. See R. v. Kelly, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 170, 183 (Can.) (affirming the importance 
of the agency relationship in modern society and that Canada Criminal Code § 426 
“acknowledges both the importance of the agency relationship and the necessity of 
preserving the integrity of that relationship”). 
 132. See id. (discussing the manner in which Section 426 of the Canada 
Criminal Code protects the fiduciary relationship between agent and principle 
while giving no indication that the agent’s status as a foreign public official or lack 
thereof has any bearing on determining whether an offense has been committed 
under the section). 
 133. R. v. Saundercook-Menard, 2007 CarswellOnt 28, ¶ 23 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) 
(WL). 
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parastatal or even a public international organization.134 The 
determining factor is whether an agency relationship exists and not 
whether the principal is a parastatal or foreign public official. 
5. Any Undue Pecuniary or Other Advantage 
Like the CFPOA, the secret commissions offense is similarly 
broad in terms of what might be considered a benefit. The statute 
specifically provides that “any reward, advantage or benefit of any 
kind” may constitute the improper inducement.135 
6. Affairs or Business of the Agent’s Principal 
The secret commissions offense is not restricted to business 
activities. Nor is the offense limited to for-profit activities. Instead, it 
has a far broader application to the “affairs or business of the agent’s 
principal.”136 
D. EXCEPTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
The statutory exceptions to the CFPOA do not apply to the secret 
commissions offense.137 Given the secret commissions offense’s 
status as an indictable offense, no statute of limitations period 
applies. However, common law defenses like duress may be 
applicable.138 
 
 134. Can. Crim. Code § 426(1)(a). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.; see, e.g., R. v. Garcia, [2002] A.J. No. 1262 (Can. Alta. Prov. Ct.) 
(finding that a senior immigration inspector employed by the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service office in Alberta, Canada violated the secret commissions 
offense when he accepted payments in exchange for approval of U.S. work 
authorization applications for employees of the companies that paid him). 
 137. The statutory exceptions to the CFPOA include the local law defense, 
Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34, § 3(3)(a) (Can.), and 
the reasonable business expense defense. Id. § 3(3)(b). Though not directly 
applicable to the secret commissions offense, the underlying considerations 
associated with the exceptions to the CFPOA may be a factor as to whether there 
may be a violation of the secret commissions offense. For example, the payment of 
reasonable expenses is less likely to be suggestive of corrupt intent or reflective of 
secretive behavior. 
 138. See discussion, supra Part II.D.5. 
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IV. SANCTIONS 
A. CRIMINAL PENALTIES 
For an individual, the maximum penalty for a violation of the 
CFPOA is a fourteen-year term of imprisonment.139 This includes a 
violation of the new CFPOA record-keeping offense.140 For a 
violation of the secret commissions offense, the maximum penalty is 
a five-year term of imprisonment.141 A court has the discretion to also 
impose a fine on an individual and a legal entity with there being no 
upper limit on the amount of the fine.142 For an individual, one 
consideration is whether the individual has the ability to pay the fine 
or discharge it.143 
For an organization, a court has the discretion to prescribe 
conditions of probation which may include making restitution,144 
implementing compliance measures,145 reporting to the court on the 
implementation of the compliance measures,146 identifying an officer 
responsible for the implementation of the compliance measures,147 
requiring public disclosure regarding the conviction and compliance 
measures,148 and ordering whatever other measures it deems 
necessary to prevent a recurrence.149 
Proceeds of crime, including a violation of the CFPOA or secret 
commissions offense, may be forfeited.150 The “proceeds” of crime 
are “calculated on the basis of the ‘benefit received’ from the 
unlawful activity, rather than the ‘net profit’ from the transaction.”151 
 
 139. Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (Can.) § 3(2). 
 140. See Can. Crim. Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 4(1)–(2) (Can.). 
 141. Id. § 426(3). 
 142. See id. §§ 734, 735(1)(a); see, e.g., R. v. Griffiths Energy Int’l, [2013] A.J. 
No. 412 (Can. Alta. Q.B.); R. v. GEI, Agreed Statement of Facts, supra note 53, ¶¶ 
15–16, 19, 21 (citing GEI’s self-disclosure, its level of cooperation, and its 
implementation of remedial measures as factors in reducing the level of the fine 
imposed). 
 143. Can. Crim. Code § 734(2). 
 144. Id. § 732(3.1)(a). 
 145. Id. § 732(3.1)(b). 
 146. Id. § 732(3.1)(d). 
 147. Id. § 732(3.1)(e). 
 148. Id. § 732(3.1)(f)(i)–(iii). 
 149. Id. § 732(3.1)(g). 
 150. Id. § 462.37(1). 
 151. Canada Phase 3 Report, supra note 16, ¶ 68. 
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Forfeiture is premised on the “balance of probabilities.”152 Similarly, 
crime-related property is also subject to forfeiture.153 
B. CIVIL PENALTIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS 
Civil and administrative sanctions may follow from a conviction 
for a violation of the CFPOA. A permanent debarment now 
automatically follows from a conviction under the CFPOA.154 Public 
Works and Government Services Canada will no longer enter into a 
contract or real property transaction, or accept bids from companies 
convicted of a violation of the CFPOA.155 
C. MONEY LAUNDERING 
A violation of the CFPOA or the secret commissions offense is a 
“designated offence” fully subject to Canada’s money laundering 
statute.156 The money laundering statute applies to every one 
who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or 
place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in 
any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any 
property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, 
knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or of those 
proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of [a 
violation of the CFPOA].157 
A term of imprisonment of ten years can be imposed on an individual 
 
 152. Can. Crim. Code § 462.37(1). 
 153. Id. § 490.1. 
 154. Integrity Provisions, PUBLIC WORKS AND GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
CANADA, https://buyandsell.gc.ca/policy-and-guidelines/policy-notifications/PN-
107 (last modified Dec. 17, 2012). 
 155. Id.; see Canada Follow-up to the Phase 3 Report, supra note 17, at 7 
(mandating that companies “provide consent stating that neither they, nor those on 
the Board of Governors for their company, nor any of their affiliates have ever 
committed certain acts or offences,” including bribery of a foreign public official, 
before receiving a Public Works and Government Services Contract). But see id. 
(providing an exception for anyone who has “received a pardon, or capacities 
restored by Governor-in-Council”). 
 156. See Can. Crim. Code § 462.3(1)(a) (defining “designated offence” as “any 
offence that may be prosecuted as an indictable offence under this or any other Act 
of Parliament, other than an indictable offence prescribed by regulation”); see also 
id. § 462.31 (laying out the elements of laundering proceeds of crime).  
 157. Id. 
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for a violation.158 
In addition, it is also an indictable offense to knowingly possess 
property or the proceeds of property obtained or derived, either 
directly or indirectly, from a violation of the CFPOA or the secret 
commissions offense.159 If the value of the property exceeds $5,000, 
an individual would be subject to a term of imprisonment of ten 
years.160 
V. CONCLUSION 
Combined with the secret commissions offense and the new 
amendments to the CFPOA, Canada’s anti-bribery legal regime now 
resembles both the scope and reach of the FCPA and the UK Bribery 
Act. In addition to the expanded reach of its legal regime, Canadian 
authorities now have in place the necessary resources and requisite 
expertise to actively and effectively enforce the CFPOA. For these 
reasons, prudence dictates that entities engaged in international 
activities give particular attention to implementing and actively 
enforcing measures relevant to complying with the CFPOA in 
addition to the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act. 
 
 
 158. Id. § 462.31(2)(a). 
 159. Id. § 354(1)(a). 
 160. Id. § 355.2 (clarifying that an individual would otherwise be subject to a 
term of imprisonment of two years or subject to being charged with a summary 
offense). 
